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Abstract: We examine the effect of war on state fiscal capacity in developing 
countries, measured by tax revenue to GDP ratios. In divided or factionalised 
societies, patronage may substitute for common interest public goods, with the 
possibility of violent contestation over a rent. Our dynamic panel empirical esti-
mates of the determinants of fiscal capacity are applied to 79 developing coun-
tries, during 1980–2010. Results indicate that war, especially civil war, retards 
fiscal capacity, along with poor governance, oil dependence and macroeconomic 
mismanagement.
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The functions of the state are important in maintaining societal cohesion and 
sustaining the social contract between rulers and ruled. Besides a legitimate 
Weberian monopoly over violence, a functioning state must be able to enforce 
laws, property rights and contracts, as well as have the capacity to raise rev-
enues and provide public goods (Mill 1848). A modern state must also be able 
to provide a wider range of public goods (health, education for example), in 
addition to a capacity to regulate markets. More affluent nations have bigger 
governments (World Bank 2010), as measured by the share of government con-
sumption in national income. Economic decline in ‘failing’ states undermines 
the state’s fiscal capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s ability to guarantee 
personal security, property rights and laws is seriously compromised, leading 
to the gradual privatisation of violence between predatory and defensive ele-
ments within society. Individuals rely on kinship based groups and warlords 
for security and public good provision; this in turn heightens the risk of civil 
war as society descends towards an anarchical state. In the contemporary 
developing world the lack of fiscal/state capacity enhances civil war risk; civil 
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war in turn further attenuates fiscal capacity by undermining pre-existing 
fiscal institutions. State capacity is also essential for sustained growth with 
equity, which is the major challenge for developing countries. This requires 
that the state is able to command resources for its activities and public goods 
provision.
Curiously, war may have facilitated the development of state capacity in 
Europe since the 15th century (Tilly 1992). Gradually, as wars became increas-
ingly complex, requiring larger forces which had to be maintained for longer 
periods, other sources of finance (newer taxes or borrowing) had to be explored 
and invented. Increased taxation and conscription compelled rulers to make 
concessions to wider sections of the population. This meant more representa-
tive government, augmentation of state activities towards regulating produc-
tion, manipulating distribution, providing social protection; in short more and 
more public goods. A history of making war against a nation’s common external 
enemies may lay the foundations for future state capacity, and assist nation build-
ing, as it lays the basis for fiscal and legal institutions. This process, however, may 
not apply to internal conflict, which often undermines institutions, and interest 
in the provision of public goods.
Many developing countries commenced their post-colonial existence with 
reasonable institutions and state capacity. The last quarter of the 20th century, 
however, witnessed growth and development failure in many parts of the devel-
oping world, especially in Africa. Associated with these developments, state 
capacity has declined, and several of these nations have also experienced civil 
war, which is widely believed to attenuate state capacity even further. Other 
developing countries, including those not experiencing civil war, are charac-
terized by factional politics, with governments, even democratically elected 
ones, serving particular group interests. These states have little interest in pro-
viding common interest public goods to its entire citizenry, but will, instead, 
concentrate on using the state’s resources to reward their own faction via politi-
cal patronage. Patronage substitutes for wide ranging public goods. Thus, state 
capacity as measured by government expenditure as a proportion of national 
income may be low, but tax revenues as a share of national income will certainly 
be smaller in factionalized states where patronage is widespread; the state may 
also rely on overseas aid and its ability to directly command resources, royalties 
and rents for revenues.
We empirically analyze the effect of war, whose dominant form nowadays 
is civil war, on the fiscal capacity of the state in the contemporary developing 
world (between 1980 and 2010), measured by the tax/GDP ratio, which is our 
dependent variable. We do not look at government expenditure, because total 
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state spending may be financed not only by taxation and borrowing, but also 
direct access to rents, royalties, state trading monopolies and foreign aid.
The state may also rely on inflation taxes, and manipulate the exchange rate 
to capture more resources for itself (we proxy this via a dual exchange rate vari-
able). The rationale for using per capita GDP as one of the control variables is 
because richer nations tend to have better scores in governance indicators, and 
more solid and mature fiscal institutions.
We capture the nature of the state through governance variables. A poorly 
governed state, with weak institutions will have less fiscal capacity. The indica-
tors of economic freedom (EFI from Gwartney and Lawson 2011) capture the likely 
impact of governance in the context of risk and prudential regulation prevail-
ing in that country. They not only show how governments are elected, monitored 
and replaced, but also their capacity to formulate and implement public poli-
cies effectively as well as the attitude of the electorate and their representatives 
toward the institutions that govern economic, political, and social interactions. 
The conflict data are from UCDP (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Depending on 
the intensity of the conflict, we allow for three conflict categories: Low, Medium, 
and High corresponding to the alpha-numeric ranking 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
An important complication in empirically studying the impact of conflict 
on state capacity is the potential for endogeneity biases, reverse causation, and 
omitted variables. We try to address these concerns by using country and time 
fixed effects. In order to address biases due to reverse causality, we run regressions 
lagging all regressors one period, and we conduct dynamic system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimations, using lagged regressors as instruments.
We test our model on a sample of 79 countries. The choice of countries is 
determined by the availability of consistent data on all the variables. The analysis 
uses a panel data set with data averaged over 5-year periods from 1980 to 2010. 
Full details can be found in Chowdhury and Murshed (2013).
A selection of some of the regression results in Chowdhury and Murshed 
(2013) are presented in Table 1. The presence of conflict is found to be costly 
in terms of a long-run reduction in fiscal capacity. Hence, any policy measures 
that would reduce the intensity of conflict would go a long way in enhancing the 
revenue capability in the developing countries. Dual (distorted) exchange rates, 
inflation and openness all impact negatively and significantly on tax capacity. We 
also examine the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on the state’s fiscal capacity 
by including an index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 2003). In 
column 3 of Table 1, the variable turns out to be negative and statistically signifi-
cant. We also add an oil and gas exporter dummy; oil exporting countries appear 
less dependent on domestic resource mobilization.
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Table 1: System GMM estimation results: ethnicity & oil and gas exporter dummy.
Variable   Base 
equation
  Ethnicity   Ethnicity   Oil/Gas   Oil/Gas
Constant   12.24 (6.20)   6.22 (3.45)   7.15 (3.91)   4.70 (2.56)   3.66 (2.90)
Conflict   –1.84 (5.63)   –   –   –   –
Log(GDP PC)   0.54 (3.74)   0.45 (2.68)   0.64 (3.14)   0.31 (2.96)   0.70 (3.03)
log(GDP)   0.78 (2.94)   2.44 (5.34)   1.80 (3.96)   1.98 (5.76)   1.04 (3.80)
Inflation   –1.20 (4.12)   –0.65 (2.65)   –1.02 (4.40)   –1.50 (3.70)   –1.94 (3.70)
Dual ex rate   –1.33 (4.59)   –0.87 (3.90)   –1.15 (4.16)   –1.12 (4.39)   –1.35 (3.66)
Trade   –0.49 (3.23)   –1.54 (4.10)   –0.63 (3.80)   –0.76 (3.87)   –0.85 (2.38)
EFI   3.90 (7.42)   2.35 (5.54)   2.40 (6.60)   2.75 (6.10)   1.80 (4.33)
Ethnicity   –   –0.74 (1.11)   –0.82 (2.04)   –   –
Oil/Gas dummy   –   –   –   –1.12 (3.46)   –2.64 (4.15)
Africa*conflict   –0.08 (2.00)   –0.43 (3.72)   –0.36 (2.14)   –0.64 (3.65)   –0.49 (3.04)
Ethnicity*conflict   –   0.65 (1.45)   –   –   –
Oil/Gas*conflict   –   –   –   –0.18 (2.35)   –
1st order serial corr.
(p-value)
  0.06   0.10   0.04   0.10   0.07
2nd order serial corr. 
(p-value)
  0.43   0.22   0.18   0.27   0.34
Years indicator   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Country fixed effect   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
AR(1) p-value   0.014   0.009   0.008   0.011   0.017
AR(2) p-value   0.336   0.190   0.236   0.202   0.226
Hansen test for 
Overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value)
  14.68 (0.18)   13.11 (0.17)   12.84 (.12)   9.35 (0.11)   11.14 (0.13)
Sargan test (p-value)  0.26   0.12   0.17   0.12   0.17
Difference Sargan 
test (p-value) 
  0.24   0.19   0.20   0.22   0.22
Number of countries   79   79   79   76   76
Number of 
observations
  510   510   510   480   480
Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-statistics.
We find that war, which is dominantly civil war, does not promote the fiscal 
capacity of the state in contemporary developing countries, unlike the findings 
of Charles Tilly for inter-state war in European history. This may be attributable 
to the destructive influence of civil war on political and economic institutions, 
as well as the possibility that civil war is symptom of the lack of common inter-
est public goods. Ultimately, however, Charles Tilly may have got it right – state 
building remains a quasi-criminal activity – a process which may not necessitate 
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the development of fiscal capacity as long as alternative sources of coercive 
resource extraction remain available to those who govern.
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